标题: WikiLeaks cables: How China lost patience with North Korea [打印本页] 作者: 伊万豆夫 时间: 2010-12-3 15:30 标题: WikiLeaks cables: How China lost patience with North Korea
WikiLeaks cables: How China lost patience with North KoreaChinese are willing to accept Korean reunification, secret cables show – but they want the US to take the lead
An honour guard at a Beijing ceremony for North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. US embassy cables reveal the lack of a clearly agreed US-China policy on Pyongyang. Photograph: Alfred Cheng Jin/Reuters China's willingness to accept Korean reunification, revealed in private conversations between senior Communist party officials and US and South Korean diplomats, reflects Beijing's deep, previously concealed exasperation with its wayward ally North Korea.
But the leaked US diplomatic cables suggest there is no consensus on how to proceed towards this goal, with Beijing and Washington looking to each other to take the lead.
China's reluctance to confront its ally was highlighted last week after the North launched a one-hour artillery bombardment of a South Korean island, plunging the peninsula into one of its worst crises since the Korean war. The White House swiftly deplored what it called an "outrageous" act and pledged military solidarity with South Korea. But Beijing declined to condemn Pyongyang, instead calling for calm and a resumption of talks on the North's nuclear programme.
Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, was among several American officials who subsequently demanded China take a stand. US pressure seems to have yielded limited results, with Beijing today inviting a North Korean official for talks in an apparent mediation effort. A senior Chinese diplomat has also travelled to Seoul as part of what China is calling "emergency consultations".
It was reported last night that US, Japanese and South Korean officials will meet in Washington on 6 December to discuss the crisis with North Korea.
But China's immediate Korea priorities continue unchanged: maintaining stability, a benign economic environment, and if possible, a peaceful dialogue. Notwithstanding its openness in the longer term to the idea of reconciliation and reunification, Beijing remains unwilling to do anything that could force the North Korea into a corner and increase the possibility that it might lash out unpredictably.
A December 2009 meeting with US officials in Beijing shows the Chinese side sticking firmly to this gameplan, placing the ball firmly in America's court after a year in which North Korea deliberately stoked international tensions over its nuclear and missile programmes.
William Burns, US undersecretary of state for political affairs, was told by Wang Jiarui, director of international liaison for the Communist party's central committee, that North Korea "needed a breakthrough in its relations with the United States … because of its domestic situation and the current international environment.
"Wang reiterated China's longstanding position that the key objective at this stage was to prevent the situation on the Korean peninsula from spinning out of control and to establish a positive direction through dialogue and negotiation." Wang continued: "It was not in US interests to prolong the current state of hostility [and the US should demonstrate] it had no intention of promoting regime change … This was contingent upon a change in North Korean behaviour and an eventual North Korean pledge to the world that it would not embark on the road to nuclear weapons."
Beijing's assessment as reported in the cables was echoed by a South Korean official involved in talks with North Korea. He told diplomats in Seoul that Pyongyang wanted Washington to guarantee its sovereignty and territorial integrity, preferably through a peace treaty, and firmly believed Washington alone could do this. "The DPRK craved a dialogue with the US, aiming for a 'big deal', but first needed to raise tensions to create the need for dialogue," the official said. Colonel Lee Sang-chul, North Korea policy division director at Seoul's ministry of national defence, said he believed the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, had suffered "physical and psychological trauma" as a result of his reported stroke in 2008 and had become obsessed with creating political stability to allow an orderly succession.
In another meeting between James Steinberg, US deputy secretary of state, and Chinese officials in 2009, high-ranking state councillor Dai Bingguo reported "frank and blunt" discussions with North Korea about the need to return to the six-party talks on Pyongyang's nuclear programme. North Korea's vice-foreign minister, Kang Sok-ju, and others told their Chinese visitor they wanted dialogue with Washington first.
Dai indicated that China supported bilateral discussions and advised there was "no limit to how far you could go. Dai admitted … his conversation with Kim [Jong-il] was not as direct and candid and joked that he 'did not dare' to be that candid with the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] leader". Dai said Kim "appeared to be in reasonably good health and still had 'a sharp mind'". There has been speculation about Kim's health and its impact on North Korea's stability since his alleged stroke in 2008.
Despite China's insistence that the US must show the way, the Americans appear convinced Beijing has more leverage than it admits – and are concerned the situation in North Korea could rapidly deteriorate.
In a confidential report of a meeting in February 2010 between the US assistant secretary of state Kurt Campbell and the then South Korean national security adviser, Kim Sung-hwan, Kim – who is now foreign minister – is quoted as saying that Kim Jong-il would visit China "soon" in order to obtain desperately needed economic assistance. The prediction proved correct: Kim travelled to Beijing in May and again in August.
"The situation inside North Korea, he [Kim Sung-hwan] added, appeared increasingly unstable. The north's currency replacement had created strong resentment throughout DPRK society, Kim said … Kim asserted there were credible reports of unrest in the north; according to ROK [Republic of Korea] intelligence sources DPRK police recently found a bomb on a passenger train en route from Pyongyang to Beijing."This assessment finds an echo in a meeting between senior US officials and South Korea's then foreign minister, Yu Myung-hwan, in January 2010.
"Yu asserted that … KJI [Kim Jong-il] needed both Chinese economic aid and political support to stabilise an 'increasingly chaotic' situation at home. In particular FM Yu claimed that the north's botched currency reform had caused 'big problems' for the regime and that the power succession from KJI to Kim Jong-un was 'not going smoothly'. Moreover, Yu confided, an unspecified number of high-ranking North Korean officials working overseas had recently defected to the ROK. (Note: Yu emphasised that the defections have not been made public.)"
The problems caused by the lack of a clearly agreed US-China policy on how to deal with North Korea are exacerbated by tensions and rivalries between other countries involved in the six-party process. One leaked cable reports a stinging attack by a senior South Korean minister on Wu Dawei, China's vice-foreign minister, who was Beijing's lead negotiator in the talks. He suggested Wu was an old-school communist not up to the job [ID: 249870].
In an indication of international pessimism, the Russian ambassador at large to the six-party talks lamented to US diplomats in Moscow that "no one had good ideas on how to pull North Korea back from its brinkmanship".
Grigoriy Logvinov said his country's foreign minister (Sergey Lavrov) had just had a rough trip to North Korea because its leadership "was 'very angry' and told Lavrov categorically that it was resolved to restart its nuclear programme, would never participate in the six-party talks again and would not trust anything but nuclear deterrence as its security guarantee".
Logvinov urged patience, suggesting Pyongyang's hard line "was either a negotiating tactic or an indication that a power transition was near, but in any case did not represent the final word on the denuclearisation issue". He derided North Korea's rocket as "a piece of junk that miraculously flew".作者: bobbyxi 时间: 2010-12-3 15:38
WikiLeaks documents posted on the websites of the Guardian and the New York Times suggest China is losing patience with its long-time ally North Korea, with senior figures in Beijing describing the regime in the North as behaving like a "spoiled child."
According to cables obtained by WikiLeaks and cited by the Guardian, South Korea's vice-foreign minister Chun Yung-woo said he had been told by two senior Chinese officials (whose names are redacted in the cables) that they believed Korea should be reunified under Seoul's control, and that this view was gaining ground with the leadership in Beijing.
In a cable sent by U.S. Ambassador Kathleen Stevens earlier this year, Chun said the North had already collapsed economically and would collapse politically two to three years after the death of leader Kim Jong-il.
CNN has viewed the cables posted on the newspapers' websites.
Chun dismissed the prospect of a possible Chinese military intervention in the event of a North Korean collapse, noting that China's strategic economic interests now lie with the United States, Japan and South Korea - not North Korea.
He said that younger generation Chinese Communist party leaders no longer regarded North Korea as a useful or reliable ally and would not risk renewed armed conflict on the peninsula, according to a secret cable to Washington.
In a separate cable from January this year, then-South Korean Foreign Mnister Yu Myung-Hwan is quoted as telling U.S. diplomats that "the North Korean leader [Kim Jong Il] needed both Chinese economic aid and political support to stabilize an 'increasingly chaotic' situation at home."
The cables suggest China is frustrated in its relationship with Pyongyang. One from April 2009 quoted Chinese Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei as saying that "North Korea wanted to engage directly with the United States and was therefore acting like a "spoiled child" in order to get the attention of the "adult." The cable continued: "China therefore encouraged the United States, 'after some time,' to start to re-engage the DPRK."
In October 2009, a cable sent from Beijing recounted a meeting between U.S. diplomats and Chinese State Councillor Dai Bingguo, who had recently met Kim Jong Il. According to the leaked cable, Dai noted that Kim had lost weight when compared to when he last saw him three years earlier, but that Kim appeared to be in reasonably good health and still had a "sharp mind."
Dai also spoke about Kim's liking for alcohol. The cable continued: "Kim Jong-il had a reputation among the Chinese for being 'quite a good drinker,' and, Dai said, he had asked Kim if he still drank alcohol. Kim said yes."
The North Koreans told Dai that they wanted to have dialogue with the United States first and that they would consider next steps, including possible multilateral talks, depending on their conversation with the United States. North Korea held "great expectations for the United States," said Dai.
Further evidence of China's unease at Pyongyang's behavior came in a cable in June 2009 from the U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan, Richard Hoagland. He reported that the Chinese envoy there was "genuinely concerned by North Korea's recent nuclear missile tests," and saw its nuclear activity a 'threat to the whole world's security.'" Hoagland reported that China's objectives were "to ensure they [North Korean leaders] honor their commitments on non-proliferation, maintain stability, and 'don't drive [Kim Jong-il] mad.'"
It seems the Russians were similarly frustrated by North Korean obduracy. In April 2009, a U.S. diplomatic cable quoted a senior Russian official as saying that "Foreign Minister Lavrov had a difficult trip to North Korea that did not reveal any flexibility in DPRK's position." The Russian official assessed that Pyongyang was "hunkering down for a succession crisis."
Taiwan
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¶11. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked MM Lee for his assessment of Taiwan. MM Lee said former President Chen Shui-bian had left Taiwan in a weak economic position, which had enabled President Ma Ying-Jeou to come to power with his pledge to strengthen the economy through means including expanding the three links with China. In Beijing, former President Jiang Zemin was wedded to his eight-point approach, but President Hu Jintao was more flexible. Jiang wanted to show he was a great man by solving the Taiwan issue in his lifetime, but Hu is more patient and does not have any fixed timeline. In Chinese domestic politics, Hu had wanted Vice Premier Li Keqiang from the Communist Youth League to emerge as his successor, not Vice President Xi Jinping, but Hu did his calculations and accepted Xi when it became clear that Xi had the necessary backing from the rest of the leadership. Similarly, on Taiwan, Hu will be pragmatic. It does not matter to Hu if it takes 10 years or 20 or 30. The key is building links with Taiwan. As in the case of Hong Kong, if necessary the tap could be turned off, he said.
¶12. (C) In this context, MM Lee said, Hu could live with Ma’s positions on the ‘92 consensus and on not addressing the reunification issue during his term in office. What mattered to Hu was that Taiwan not seek independence. If that happened, China has 1,000 missiles and is building its capacity to hold the U.S. fleet at a distance. The implicit question for Taiwan’s leaders is if that is what they want, MM Lee said.
¶13. (C) MM Lee stated that the alternative is Mainland investment in Taiwan stocks and property. The Mainland has already assured Hong Kong that it will help out economically. The Mainland has not said this to Taiwan, but the Mainland’s Taiwan Affairs Director, Wang Yi, did urge Chinese companies to invest in Taiwan. In four years Taiwan’s economy will pick up and Ma will win re-election. The DPP lacks strong potential candidates. Su Zhen-chang is promising, but seems unlikely to be able to win. Meanwhile, even the traditionally DPP-supporting farmers in Taiwan’s South need China’s market for vegetables and other products. Taiwan’s continued participation in the World Health Assembly depends on Beijing. Beijing’s calculation seems to be to prevent Taiwan independence in the near term, then bring Taiwan “back to China,” even if it takes 40 or 50 years. MM Lee said he is looking forward to visiting Fujian Province, where preparations are underway for a new southern economic area linked with Taiwan.
Xi Jinping
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¶14. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked if in the future a leader like Xi Jinping would continue the policies on Taiwan followed by Hu Jintao. MM Lee responded affirmatively. Xi is a princeling who succeeded despite being rusticated. When the party needed his talents, Xi was brought in as Shanghai Party Secretary. Xi is seen as a Jiang Zemin protege, but in another three and a half years Jiang’s influence will be gone. The focus now is on maintaining the system. There are no more strongmen like Deng Xiaoping. Jiang did not like Hu, but could not stop him, because Hu had the backing of the system and he did not make mistakes.
Wang Qishan作者: energetic 时间: 2010-12-3 23:36
WikiLeaks cables reveal personal details on world leaders
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Leaked U.S. cables reveal sensitive diplomacy
Hundreds of thousands of State Department documents leaked Sunday revealed a hidden world of backstage international diplomacy, divulging candid comments from world leaders and detailing occasional U.S. pressure tactics overseas.
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Sunday, November 28, 2010; 8:57 PM
Analysis of world leaders gets personal
The U.S. diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks offer unvarnished insights into the personal proclivities of world leaders and how American diplomats privately view them.
According to one such memo, Moammar Gaddafi, the leader of Libya, has an intense dislike of staying above the first floor of hotels and cannot climb more than 35 steps. His fear of flying creates logistical headaches for his staff, who make great attempts to avoid long flights over water.
And Gaddafi is reportedly obsessively dependent on traveling with a Ukrainian nurse described as a "voluptuous blonde" because she alone "knows his routine."
The details on Gaddafi were included in a State Department cable in September 2009 during the leader's visit to New York for the United Nations General Assembly.
In the cable, Gene A. Cretz, U.S. ambassador to Tripoli, concluded: "While it is tempting to dismiss his many eccentricities as signs of instability, Qadhafi is a complicated individual who has managed to stay in power for forty years through a skillful balancing of interests and realpolitik methods."
This is one of many distinctly undiplomatic sketches of the world's leading statesmen contained in the documents released Sunday. Among the highlights, as reported by Britain's Guardian newspaper:
- U.S. diplomats quoted sources describing North Korean leader Kim Jong Il as a "flabby old chap" and someone who had suffered "physical and psychological trauma" as a result of his stroke.
- French President Nicholas Sarkozy, in the view of U.S. diplomats in Paris, has a "thin-skinned and authoritarian personal style" because of his tendency to rebuke his team and the French prime minister.
- An official at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow wrote in late 2008 about the relationship between Russian President Dimitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin that Medvedev "plays Robin to Putin's Batman."
- Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi is "feckless, vain and ineffective as a modern European leader," according to a U.S. official in Rome. Another cable remarked on Berlusconi's "frequent late nights and penchant for partying hard."
- Afghan President Hamid Karzai is described in one cable from Kabul as "an extremely weak man who did not listen to facts but was instead easily swayed by anyone who came to report even the most bizarre stories or plots against him."
- Philip Rucker作者: 伊万豆夫 时间: 2010-12-4 13:52
Top 10 revelations from WikiLeaks cables
By Zachary Roth
Buzz up!110 votes ShareretweetEmailPrintBy Zachary Roth zachary Roth – Mon Nov 29, 10:05 am ET
On Sunday, five international news outlets published a selection of more than 250,000 U.S. diplomatic cables, provided by the website WikiLeaks. The disclosure of the cables, most of them from the past three years, offers a rare unfiltered view of the secretive world of high-level diplomacy. As such, it could complicate relations with a host of friendly and unfriendly nations.
But what did we actually learn? Here are 10 key revelations from the cables:
1. Many Middle Eastern nations are far more concerned about Iran's nuclear program than they've publicly admitted. According to one cable, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia has repeatedly asked the U.S. to "cut off the head of the snake" -- meaning, it appears, to bomb Iran's nuclear program. Leaders of Qatar, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and other Middle Eastern nations expressed similar views.
2. The U.S. ambassador to Seoul told Washington in February that the right business deals might get China to acquiesce to a reunified Korea, if the newly unified power were allied with the United States. American and South Korean officials have discussed such a reunification in the event that North Korea collapses under the weight of its economic and political problems.
[Related: WikiLeaks docs reveal U.S. diplomats insulting world leaders]
3. The Obama administration offered sweeteners to try to get other countries to take Guantanamo detainees, as part of its (as yet unsuccessful) effort to close the prison. Slovenia, for instance, was offered a meeting with President Obama, while the island nation of Kiribati was offered incentives worth millions.
4. Afghan Vice President Ahmed Zia Massoud took $52 million in cash when he visited the United Arab Emirates last year, according to one cable. The Afghan government has been plagued by allegations of corruption. Massoud has denied taking the money out of the country.
5. The United States has been working to remove highly enriched uranium from a Pakistani nuclear reactor, out of concern that it could be used to build an illicit nuclear device. The effort, which began in 2007, continues.
6. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton ordered diplomats to assemble information on their foreign counterparts. Documents in the WikiLeaks cache also indicate that Clinton may have asked diplomats to gather intelligence on U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon's plans for Iran, and information on Sudan (including Darfur), Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Iran and North Korea.
7. The State Department labeled Qatar the worst country in the region for counterterrorism efforts. The country's security services were "hesitant to act against known terrorists out of concern for appearing to be aligned with the U.S. and provoking reprisals," according to one cable.
8. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi are tighter than was previously known. Putin has given the high-living Berlusconi "lavish gifts" and lucrative energy contracts, and Berlusconi "appears increasingly to be the mouthpiece of Putin" in Europe, according to one cable.
[Related: The Guardian gave State Dept. cables to the NY Times]
9. Hezbollah continues to enjoy the weapons patronage of Syria. A week after Syrian president Bashar Assad promised the United States he wouldn't send "new" arms to the Lebanese militant group, the United States said it had information that Syria was continuing to provide the group with increasingly sophisticated weapons.
10. Some cables reveal decidedly less than diplomatic opinions of foreign leaders. Putin is said to be an "alpha-dog" and Afghan President Hamid Karzai to be "driven by paranoia." German Chancellor Angela Merkel "avoids risk and is rarely creative." Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi travels with a "voluptuous blonde" Ukrainian nurse.
The cables were obtained, via WikiLeaks, by the New York Times, the Guardian of Britain, Der Spiegel of Germany, Le Monde of France and El Pais of Spain.作者: 伊万豆夫 时间: 2010-12-4 13:53
WikiLeaks cables point to China in Google hack
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Much has been written and broadcast over the past 24- hour news cycle about the diplomatic fallout of the latest WikiLeaks caper.
Today, some news outlets are focusing on a subset of the leaked cables that point to China's Politburo as the orchestrator of last January's Operation Aurora, the systematic hacking of the internal networks of at least 30 high-profile corporations, especially Google.
That revelation underscores the notion that nation-state cyberspying goes beyond snooping for military advantage, says Mandeep Khera, a senior executive at web security firm Cenzic.
Cyberspies are "also targeting corporations and influential individuals in an attempt to unravel the infrastructure of the targeted country," says Khera. "Whether it is trade secrets, intellectual property, or government secrets, foreign perpetrators will continue to cause chaos for the U.S. cybersecurity infrastructure, unless we can anticipate these attacks."
Operation Aurora came to light last January after Google went public about it, intimating that the Chinese government played a role in hacking into its databases as part of a campaign to persecute political dissidents. The incident set off an international furor, as we reported in this cover story, and Google ultimately shut down its Beijing operations.
Among the 250,000 U.S. Embassy cables released by WikiLeaks are exchanges between a Chinese contact and the U.S. embassy in Beijing; one dispatch describes a Chinese source informing the U.S. Embassy that China's Politburo sanctioned the attack on Google.