WikiLeaks cables: How China lost patience with North Korea
WikiLeaks cables: How China lost patience with North KoreaChinese are willing to accept Korean reunification, secret cables show – but they want the US to take the lead[list][*][url=http://www.guardian.co.uk/profile/simontisdall][b][color=#005689]Simon Tisdall[/color][/b][/url][*][url=http://www.guardian.co.uk/][color=#005689]guardian.co.uk[/color][/url], Monday 29 November 2010 21.40 GMT[*][url=http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/29/north-korea-china-us-buck#history-link-box][color=#005689]Article history[/color][/url][/list][color=#005689][img=460,276]http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2010/11/26/1290769577733/An-honour-guard-at-a-cere-007.jpg[/img][/color] An honour guard at a Beijing ceremony for North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. US embassy cables reveal the lack of a clearly agreed US-China policy on Pyongyang. Photograph: Alfred Cheng Jin/Reuters [url=http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/china][color=#005689]China[/color][/url]'s willingness to accept Korean reunification, revealed in private conversations between senior Communist party officials and US and South Korean diplomats, reflects Beijing's deep, previously concealed exasperation with its wayward ally [url=http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/north-korea][color=#005689]North Korea[/color][/url].But the leaked US diplomatic cables suggest there is no consensus on how to proceed towards this goal, with Beijing and Washington looking to each other to take the lead.
China's reluctance to confront its ally was highlighted last week after the North launched a one-hour artillery bombardment of a South Korean island, plunging the peninsula into one of its worst crises since the Korean war. The White House swiftly deplored what it called an "outrageous" act and pledged military solidarity with [url=http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/south-korea][color=#005689]South Korea[/color][/url]. But Beijing declined to condemn Pyongyang, instead calling for calm and a resumption of talks on the North's nuclear programme.
Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, was among several American officials who subsequently demanded China take a stand. US pressure seems to have yielded limited results, with Beijing today inviting a North Korean official for talks in an apparent mediation effort. A senior Chinese diplomat has also travelled to Seoul as part of what China is calling "emergency consultations".
It was reported last night that US, Japanese and South Korean officials will meet in Washington on 6 December to discuss the crisis with North Korea.
But China's immediate Korea priorities continue unchanged: maintaining stability, a benign economic environment, and if possible, a peaceful dialogue. Notwithstanding its openness in the longer term to the idea of reconciliation and reunification, Beijing remains unwilling to do anything that could force the North Korea into a corner and increase the possibility that it might lash out unpredictably.
A December 2009 meeting with US officials in Beijing shows the Chinese side sticking firmly to this gameplan, placing the ball firmly in America's court after a year in which North Korea deliberately stoked international tensions over its nuclear and missile programmes.
William Burns, US undersecretary of state for political affairs, was told by Wang Jiarui, director of international liaison for the Communist party's central committee, that North Korea "[url=http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/239384][color=#005689]needed a breakthrough in its relations with the United States[/color][/url] … because of its domestic situation and the current international environment.
"Wang reiterated China's longstanding position that the key objective at this stage was to prevent the situation on the Korean peninsula from spinning out of control and to establish a positive direction through dialogue and negotiation." Wang continued: "It was not in US interests to prolong the current state of hostility [and the US should demonstrate] it had no intention of promoting regime change … This was contingent upon a change in North Korean behaviour and an eventual North Korean pledge to the world that it would not embark on the road to nuclear weapons."
Beijing's assessment as reported in the cables was echoed by a South Korean official involved in talks with North Korea. He told diplomats in Seoul that Pyongyang wanted Washington to guarantee its sovereignty and territorial integrity, preferably through a peace treaty, and firmly believed Washington alone could do this. "The DPRK [url=http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/204174][color=#005689]craved a dialogue with the US[/color][/url], aiming for a 'big deal', but first needed to raise tensions to create the need for dialogue," the official said. Colonel Lee Sang-chul, North Korea policy division director at Seoul's ministry of national defence, said he believed the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, had suffered "physical and psychological trauma" as a result of his reported stroke in 2008 and had become obsessed with creating political stability to allow an orderly succession.
In another meeting between James Steinberg, US deputy secretary of state, and Chinese officials in 2009, high-ranking state councillor Dai Bingguo reported "[url=http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/231224][color=#005689]frank and blunt[/color][/url]" discussions with North Korea about the need to return to the six-party talks on Pyongyang's nuclear programme. North Korea's vice-foreign minister, Kang Sok-ju, and others told their Chinese visitor they wanted dialogue with Washington first.
Dai indicated that China supported bilateral discussions and advised there was "no limit to how far you could go. Dai admitted … his conversation with Kim [Jong-il] was not as direct and candid and joked that he 'did not dare' to be that candid with the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] leader". Dai said Kim "appeared to be in reasonably good health and still had 'a sharp mind'". There has been speculation about Kim's health and its impact on North Korea's stability since his alleged stroke in 2008.
Despite China's insistence that the US must show the way, the Americans appear convinced Beijing has more leverage than it admits – and are concerned the situation in North Korea could rapidly deteriorate.
In a confidential report of a meeting in February 2010 between the US assistant secretary of state Kurt Campbell and the then South Korean national security adviser, Kim Sung-hwan, Kim – who is now foreign minister – is quoted as saying that Kim Jong-il would visit China "soon" in order to [url=http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/249859][color=#005689]obtain desperately needed economic assistance[/color][/url]. The prediction proved correct: Kim travelled to Beijing in May and again in August.
"The situation inside North Korea, he [Kim Sung-hwan] added, appeared increasingly unstable. The north's currency replacement had created strong resentment throughout DPRK society, Kim said … Kim asserted there were credible reports of unrest in the north; according to ROK [Republic of Korea] intelligence sources DPRK police recently found a bomb on a passenger train en route from Pyongyang to Beijing."This assessment finds an echo in a meeting between senior US officials and South Korea's then foreign minister, Yu Myung-hwan, in January 2010.
"Yu asserted that … KJI [Kim Jong-il] needed both Chinese economic aid and political support to stabilise an [url=http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/243557][color=#005689]'increasingly chaotic' situation at home[/color][/url]. In particular FM Yu claimed that the north's botched currency reform had caused 'big problems' for the regime and that the power succession from KJI to Kim Jong-un was 'not going smoothly'. Moreover, Yu confided, an unspecified number of high-ranking North Korean officials working overseas had recently defected to the ROK. (Note: Yu emphasised that the defections have not been made public.)"
The problems caused by the lack of a clearly agreed US-China policy on how to deal with North Korea are exacerbated by tensions and rivalries between other countries involved in the six-party process. One leaked cable reports a stinging attack by a senior South Korean minister on Wu Dawei, China's vice-foreign minister, who was Beijing's lead negotiator in the talks. He suggested Wu was [url=http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/249870][color=#005689]an old-school communist not up to the job[/color][/url] [ID: 249870].
In an indication of international pessimism, the Russian ambassador at large to the six-party talks lamented to US diplomats in Moscow that "[url=http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/204662][color=#005689]no one had good ideas on how to pull North Korea back from its brinkmanship[/color][/url]".
Grigoriy Logvinov said his country's foreign minister (Sergey Lavrov) had just had a rough trip to North Korea because its leadership "was 'very angry' and told Lavrov categorically that it was resolved to restart its nuclear programme, would never participate in the six-party talks again and would not trust anything but nuclear deterrence as its security guarantee".
Logvinov urged patience, suggesting Pyongyang's hard line "was either a negotiating tactic or an indication that a power transition was near, but in any case did not represent the final word on the denuclearisation issue". He derided North Korea's rocket as "a piece of junk that miraculously flew". 偶乃文盲也~~ 看不懂，说了点啥？:face27: 要马上保存下来，和谐和谐~ google全文翻译就知道了 都说了些啥？谁给翻译翻译？ 不想看，太多英文 [i=s] 本帖最后由 铜川路 于 2010-12-3 17:05 编辑 [/i]
中国放弃朝鲜，原来美国也有YY。。。
楼主不地道，算会自由组合26个字母了。以后社团提倡中文输入法 楼主啊，简明扼要的翻译一下啦，阅读英文实在累 维基解密[url]http://dzh.mop.com/topic/readSub_12927841_0_0.html[/url] WikiLeaks documents posted on the websites of the Guardian and the New York Times suggest China is losing patience with its long-time ally North Korea, with senior figures in Beijing describing the regime in the North as behaving like a "spoiled child."
According to cables obtained by WikiLeaks and cited by the Guardian, South Korea's vice-foreign minister Chun Yung-woo said he had been told by two senior Chinese officials (whose names are redacted in the cables) that they believed Korea should be reunified under Seoul's control, and that this view was gaining ground with the leadership in Beijing.
In a cable sent by U.S. Ambassador Kathleen Stevens earlier this year, Chun said the North had already collapsed economically and would collapse politically two to three years after the death of leader Kim Jong-il.
CNN has viewed the cables posted on the newspapers' websites.
Chun dismissed the prospect of a possible Chinese military intervention in the event of a North Korean collapse, noting that China's strategic economic interests now lie with the United States, Japan and South Korea - not North Korea.
He said that younger generation Chinese Communist party leaders no longer regarded North Korea as a useful or reliable ally and would not risk renewed armed conflict on the peninsula, according to a secret cable to Washington.
In a separate cable from January this year, then-South Korean Foreign Mnister Yu Myung-Hwan is quoted as telling U.S. diplomats that "the North Korean leader [Kim Jong Il] needed both Chinese economic aid and political support to stabilize an 'increasingly chaotic' situation at home."
The cables suggest China is frustrated in its relationship with Pyongyang. One from April 2009 quoted Chinese Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei as saying that "North Korea wanted to engage directly with the United States and was therefore acting like a "spoiled child" in order to get the attention of the "adult." The cable continued: "China therefore encouraged the United States, 'after some time,' to start to re-engage the DPRK."
In October 2009, a cable sent from Beijing recounted a meeting between U.S. diplomats and Chinese State Councillor Dai Bingguo, who had recently met Kim Jong Il. According to the leaked cable, Dai noted that Kim had lost weight when compared to when he last saw him three years earlier, but that Kim appeared to be in reasonably good health and still had a "sharp mind."
Dai also spoke about Kim's liking for alcohol. The cable continued: "Kim Jong-il had a reputation among the Chinese for being 'quite a good drinker,' and, Dai said, he had asked Kim if he still drank alcohol. Kim said yes."
The North Koreans told Dai that they wanted to have dialogue with the United States first and that they would consider next steps, including possible multilateral talks, depending on their conversation with the United States. North Korea held "great expectations for the United States," said Dai.
Further evidence of China's unease at Pyongyang's behavior came in a cable in June 2009 from the U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan, Richard Hoagland. He reported that the Chinese envoy there was "genuinely concerned by North Korea's recent nuclear missile tests," and saw its nuclear activity a 'threat to the whole world's security.'" Hoagland reported that China's objectives were "to ensure they [North Korean leaders] honor their commitments on non-proliferation, maintain stability, and 'don't drive [Kim Jong-il] mad.'"
It seems the Russians were similarly frustrated by North Korean obduracy. In April 2009, a U.S. diplomatic cable quoted a senior Russian official as saying that "Foreign Minister Lavrov had a difficult trip to North Korea that did not reveal any flexibility in DPRK's position." The Russian official assessed that Pyongyang was "hunkering down for a succession crisis."
[url]http://edition.cnn.com/2010/US/11/29/wikileaks.new.documents/index.html[/url] 维基解密文件，对监护人和纽约时报的网站上张贴建议中国正在失去其长期盟友朝鲜的耐心，在北京的高级行为描述为像在北方政权的数字，“被宠坏的孩子。”
根据维基解密得到电缆及监护人，韩国外交部副部长千英宇列举说，他已被两名高级（其电缆中节录的名字），他们认为朝鲜应该在汉城的统一，中国官员告诉控制，而这种观点是获得与北京的领导人地面。
在由美国驻联合国大使凯瑟琳史蒂文斯今年早些时候发出的电缆，骏说，朝鲜已经崩溃的经济和会崩溃后两到三年的领导人金正日在政治上的死亡。
CNN已经观看了电缆在报纸网站上发布。
春驳回了中国可能在倒塌的北朝鲜进行军事干预的前景，指出中国的战略经济利益现在美国，日本和韩国的谎言 - 不是朝鲜。
他说，年轻一代的中共党的领导人不再被视为一个有用的或可靠的盟友朝鲜，不会冒险重新半岛的武装冲突，根据一项秘密电缆华盛顿。
在一个单独的电缆从今年一月，当时的韩国外交通商部Mnister柳明桓说是引述美国外交官说，“朝鲜领导人[金正日]需要双方的中国经济援助和政治支持，以稳定一个'越来越混乱'在家里的情况。“
该电缆表明中国是在其与平壤的关系感到沮丧。其中2009年4月引述说，“朝鲜希望与美国进行直接，因此，像演戏”被惯坏的孩子“，以获得公众的注意”成人中国外交部副部长何亚非。“有线电视继续：“中国因此，鼓励，一段时间后，'美国，开始重新接触朝鲜。”
2009年10月，来自北京的电缆发送讲述一个美国外交官和中国之间的国务委员戴秉国，谁最近会见了金正日会晤。据泄露电缆，戴指出，金正日已经失去了重量相比，最后一次见到他时，他三年前，但是，金正日似乎是在合理的身体健康，仍然有一个“敏锐的头脑。”
戴秉国还谈到了金正日对酒精的喜爱。该电缆继续说：“金正日有，作为一个华人中声誉相当好酒量，'和，戴相龙说，他已要求金，如果他仍然饮酒金正日说好。。”
北朝鲜人告诉戴，他们希望有美国第一次对话，他们将考虑今后的步骤，包括可能的多边谈判，这取决于它们与美国的对话。朝鲜举办“美国寄予厚望，说：”戴。
对中国的在平壤的行为感到不安的进一步证据是在2009年6月从美国到哈萨克斯坦大使电缆，理查德霍格兰。他报告说，中国特使，有“真正的朝鲜最近的核试射导弹有关的”，并看到了它的核活动A'到整个世界的安全构成威胁。“霍格兰报道，中国的目标是”以确保他们[朝鲜领导人]荣誉，不扩散的承诺，维护稳定，和'不开车[金正日]疯了。“
看来，俄国人同样受到朝鲜顽固感到沮丧。 2009年4月，美国外交电报引述说，俄罗斯一名高级官员“外长拉夫罗夫有困难的北韩之行并没有发现任何对朝鲜的立场的灵活性。”俄罗斯官方估计，平壤是“hunkering一个继承危机了。” 维基解密：中国如何对朝鲜中失去耐心，愿意接受朝鲜的统一 秘密展示 - 但他们希望美国带头
guardian.co.uk，星期一2010年11月29日格林尼治标准时间21.40
在一家北朝鲜领导人金正日北京举行仪式仪仗队。美国大使馆电缆揭示了一个明确同意美国对朝鲜的政策没有中国。摄影：阿尔弗雷德成金/路透中国愿意接受朝鲜的统一，在GCD的高级官员之间，美国和韩国外交官的私人谈话显示，反映了北京的深厚，其任性的盟友北韩先前隐藏的愤怒。
但美国的外交电报泄露建议没有对如何实现这一目标继续与北京和华盛顿希望对方带头，达成共识。
中国不愿面对强调了它的盟友上周推出了北韩国岛屿一个小时的炮击，纳入其朝鲜战争以来最严重的危机之一暴跌半岛。白宫迅速谴责它所谓的“无耻”的行为，并承诺与韩国军队的团结。但北京拒绝谴责平壤，而不是冷静，是对朝鲜的核计划恢复谈判的呼吁。
海军上将马伦，对美国参谋长联席会议主席，后来是谁在几个中国采取的立场，要求美国官员。美国的压力似乎已经取得了有限的成果，今天邀请了北京北的调解努力，显然是朝鲜官员举行会谈。一位资深中国外交官也到汉城的中国是什么叫“紧急磋商”的一部分。
据报道，昨晚，美国，日本和韩国的官员将于12月6日在华盛顿讨论与朝鲜的危机。
但是，中国的直接韩国重点继续保持不变：维持稳定，良性的经济环境，如果可能的话，和平对话。尽管它在长期的开放性的和解与统一思想，北京仍然不愿做任何可能迫使朝鲜一个角落，增加的可能性，它可能会抨击难以预测。
2009年12月在北京的美国官员会议表明了中方坚定地坚持这一gameplan，放置在美国的法庭上球牢牢后一年，故意引发朝鲜对其核计划和导弹计划的国际紧张局势。
伯恩斯，美国副国务卿负责政治事务，被告知由王家瑞，国际联络总监GCD中央委员会，朝鲜“需要与美国的关系有所突破...因为它的国内形势和当前的国际环境。
“王重申中国的长期立场，即在这一阶段的主要目标是防止在朝鲜半岛的局势失去控制，并通过对话和谈判建立一个积极的方向。”王接着说：“这不是美国的利益，以延长目前的敌对状态[和美国应表现出]，它没有促进政权更迭后，意图...这是在北朝鲜的行为变化和朝鲜承诺最终特遣队世界上不会走上核武器的道路。“
北京的评估报告中的作为是在与朝鲜谈判涉及的韩国官员呼应电缆。他告诉汉城，平壤希望华盛顿的外交官，以保证其主权和领土完整，最好是通过和平条约，并坚信美国能够单独做到这一点。 “朝鲜渴望与美国进行对话，一个'大交易'为目标，但首先需要提高的紧张局势，创造对话的必要性，”这名官员说。上校李相哲，北朝鲜的政策在汉城的国防部部主任说，他相信朝鲜领导人金正日，遭受了“身体和心理创伤”，作为他的报告在2008年中风的结果，并成为政治稳定，以便创造一个有秩序的继承痴迷。
在另一间斯坦伯格，美国副国务卿，并在2009年中国官员会晤，高级国务委员戴秉国报“坦率和直言不讳：”与朝鲜有关的需要返回平壤的核的六方会谈讨论计划。朝鲜外交部副部长姜锡柱等人告诉他们的中国游客，他们希望与华盛顿第一次对话。
戴相龙表示，中国支持的双边磋商，并表示，“没有限制，你可以走多远。承认...他与戴金[领导人金正日]谈话直接和坦率，开玩笑说不是他'不敢'是，与朝鲜领导人[民主朝鲜人民共和国]“坦诚。戴相龙说，金正日“似乎是合理的良好健康，仍然有'一个敏锐的头脑'。”人们关注金正日的健康状况及其对朝鲜的稳定的影响，因为他被指控在2008年中风的猜测。
尽管中国的坚持，美国必须显示方式，美国人似乎相信北京有更大的影响力比它承认 - 并且在有关朝鲜局势可能迅速恶化。
在2010年2月的一个国家之间的美国助理国务卿坎贝尔和当时的韩国国家安全顾问，金晟焕，金会议机密报告 - 谁现在是外交部长 - 是引述说，金正日将访问中国“很快”，以获得急需的经济援助。该预测证明是正确的：金前往北京五月又在八月。
“在朝鲜内部情况，他[金晟焕]增加，似乎越来越不稳定，朝鲜的货币替代创造了整个朝鲜社会的强烈不满，金正日说...金声称有动乱可信的报告，在北部;。据韩国情报来源[韩国]朝鲜警方最近发现，从平壤到北京一对旅客列车沿途的炸弹。“这个评估发现，在一间美国高级官员和韩国当时的外交部长柳明桓，在满足回声2010年1月。
“宇称，... KJI [金正日]需要双方的中国经济援助和政治支持，以稳定在回家一个'日益混乱的处境。声称特别调频于说，朝鲜的拙劣的货币改革已引起了'大问题' 。政权，从KJI权力继承金正日联合国是'不顺利，此外，于倾诉，一个高级别官员，朝鲜在海外工作的人数不详最近叛逃到韩国。（注：于强调的流失并没有被公开。）“
由一个明确商定美就如何处理中国与北朝鲜的政策而引起的问题，加剧了紧张局势和双方在六方会谈的其他国家竞争。泄漏电缆报告了一个由一名高级南靠武大伟，中国的外交部副部长，谁是北京的首席谈判代表在会谈中韩国部长激烈的抨击。他建议午是个老派的共产主义不符合工作[编号：249870]。
在一个国际悲观，俄罗斯大使在大的六方会谈表示遗憾美国外交官在莫斯科说，“没有人对如何把朝鲜带回其边缘政策的好主意。”
Grigoriy Logvinov说，他的国家的外长（拉夫罗夫）刚刚经历了艰苦的访问朝鲜，因为它的领导“是'非常气愤'，告诉拉夫罗夫明确，这是决定重新启动其核计划，就不会参加六方会谈，六方会谈，也不会再相信任何事情作为其安全保障“，但核威慑。
Logvinov呼吁耐心，显示平壤的强硬路线“是不是一种谈判策略或迹象表明，权力转移的附近，但在任何情况下并不代表无核化问题上的最后一句话。”他嘲笑为“神奇的垃圾一块飞”北朝鲜的火箭。 維基解密最新網址：
[url]http://213.251.145.96/[/url] 谷歌翻译的东西只能意会啊，难免会有细节做的不好的地方 没有中文版，中文版全部被咔咔了。 [quote]維基解密最新網址：
[url=http://213.251.145.96/]http://213.251.145.96/[/url]
[size=2][color=#999999]伊万豆夫 发表于 2010-12-3 07:50 PM[/color] [url=http://www.jiacheng.sh.cn/redirect.php?goto=findpost&pid=467469&ptid=66016][img]http://www.jiacheng.sh.cn/images/common/back.gif[/img][/url][/size][/quote]
你哪里搞来大？这都搞得到啊？ Taiwan
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¶11. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked MM Lee for his assessment of Taiwan. MM Lee said former President Chen Shui-bian had left Taiwan in a weak economic position, which had enabled President Ma Ying-Jeou to come to power with his pledge to strengthen the economy through means including expanding the three links with China. In Beijing, former President Jiang Zemin was wedded to his eight-point approach, but President Hu Jintao was more flexible. Jiang wanted to show he was a great man by solving the Taiwan issue in his lifetime, but Hu is more patient and does not have any fixed timeline. In Chinese domestic politics, Hu had wanted Vice Premier Li Keqiang from the Communist Youth League to emerge as his successor, not Vice President Xi Jinping, but Hu did his calculations and accepted Xi when it became clear that Xi had the necessary backing from the rest of the leadership. Similarly, on Taiwan, Hu will be pragmatic. It does not matter to Hu if it takes 10 years or 20 or 30. The key is building links with Taiwan. As in the case of Hong Kong, if necessary the tap could be turned off, he said.
¶12. (C) In this context, MM Lee said, Hu could live with Ma’s positions on the ‘92 consensus and on not addressing the reunification issue during his term in office. What mattered to Hu was that Taiwan not seek independence. If that happened, China has 1,000 missiles and is building its capacity to hold the U.S. fleet at a distance. The implicit question for Taiwan’s leaders is if that is what they want, MM Lee said.
¶13. (C) MM Lee stated that the alternative is Mainland investment in Taiwan stocks and property. The Mainland has already assured Hong Kong that it will help out economically. The Mainland has not said this to Taiwan, but the Mainland’s Taiwan Affairs Director, Wang Yi, did urge Chinese companies to invest in Taiwan. In four years Taiwan’s economy will pick up and Ma will win re-election. The DPP lacks strong potential candidates. Su Zhen-chang is promising, but seems unlikely to be able to win. Meanwhile, even the traditionally DPP-supporting farmers in Taiwan’s South need China’s market for vegetables and other products. Taiwan’s continued participation in the World Health Assembly depends on Beijing. Beijing’s calculation seems to be to prevent Taiwan independence in the near term, then bring Taiwan “back to China,” even if it takes 40 or 50 years. MM Lee said he is looking forward to visiting Fujian Province, where preparations are underway for a new southern economic area linked with Taiwan.
Xi Jinping
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¶14. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked if in the future a leader like Xi Jinping would continue the policies on Taiwan followed by Hu Jintao. MM Lee responded affirmatively. Xi is a princeling who succeeded despite being rusticated. When the party needed his talents, Xi was brought in as Shanghai Party Secretary. Xi is seen as a Jiang Zemin protege, but in another three and a half years Jiang’s influence will be gone. The focus now is on maintaining the system. There are no more strongmen like Deng Xiaoping. Jiang did not like Hu, but could not stop him, because Hu had the backing of the system and he did not make mistakes.
Wang Qishan 晕啊，我们公司也有位同事叫Lee MM，在香港。 CN，后悔小学拼音没学好
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